Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and by Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar

By Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar

This publication constitutes the completely refereed post-proceedings of the sixth foreign Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade, AMEC 2006, held in big apple, new york, united states in July 2004 as a part of AAMAS 2004.

The 15 revised complete papers offered have been conscientiously chosen from 39 submissions in the course of rounds of reviewing and revision. The papers collect novel paintings from such varied fields as machine technological know-how, Operations learn, synthetic Intelligence and disbursed platforms that concentrate on modeling, implementation and overview of computational buying and selling establishment and/or agent concepts over a various set of products. they're prepared in topical sections on mechanism layout, buying and selling brokers, and instruments.

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Additional info for Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York,

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Proof. Consider an agent Ai . When Ai ∈ E, the mechanism chooses a solution that does not consider the utilities of Ai . Its utility is not worse than if it had not participated in the mechanism at all, and it pays no tax. Thus, it is individually rational to participate. When Ai ∈ E, Ai is included in the optimization, and it pays the VCG tax. This scheme is known to be individually rational ex-post. Proposition 3. Mechanism 1 is budget balanced ex-post. Proof. All taxes are paid to agents in the excluded coalition E, so no tax surplus or deficit remains to be distributed.

Maskin. Efficient auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:341 388, 2000. 5. R. K. Dash, D. C. Parkes, and N. R. Jennings. Computational mechanism design: A call to arms. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 18(6):4047, 2003. 6. P. Jehiel and B. Moldovanu. Efficient design with interdependent valuations. Econometrica, 69(5):123759, 2001. 7. V. Krishna. Auction Theory. Academic Press, 2002. 8. C. Mezzetti. Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: Efficiency and full surplus extraction. Technical report, University of North Carolina, February 2003.

In order to show what happens when assumption 1 fails, consider only the single good A. 5x1 +2x2 . Then the auctioneer in this case has to decide only between two allocations, namely F = {(A, ∅), (∅, √ A)}. 25)2 − (4 − x2 ) . 25)2 − (4 − x2 ) agent 1 obtains √ the good and pays 2x2 according to equation 4. 25)2 − (4 − x2 ) , then agent 1 again obtains good A, but this time, it pays 6 (again using equation 4). Thus, it is always in the interest of agent 1 to state that its signal is in the lower range if its signal happens to occur in either of these ranges.

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